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‘SUI GENERIS’?: AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF BUYER
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION
Richard Scheelings* and Joshua D. Wright**

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
“Buyer power” is simply market power on the buyer side of a
market. In economic terms, buyer power allows buyers to force sellers
to reduce the price below the price that would result in a competitive
equilibrium. Recent policy concerns regarding buyer power have been
with respect to input markets in vertical retail supply industries. In
particular, the rise of Wal-Mart and other large, low-cost box chains1 has
raised concerns among competition policy specialists about possible
abuse of the market power which, it is alleged, such chains exercise over
input suppliers. Similarly, it is sometimes alleged that supermarkets can
act as “gatekeepers” through their possession of market power. Other
examples of buyer power include the timber industry and the meatpacking industry.2 The obvious policy question is whether buyer power
exhibits special properties that justify different treatment from traditional
seller monopoly power for the purposes of antitrust analysis. It is also
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Consultant (LECG, Brussels) and Lecturer, Economics Department, Monash University,
Melbourne, Australia. Ph.D. UCLA Department of Economics, LL.B. (Hons) University of
Melbourne Law School, Barrister and Solicitor of the ACT Supreme Court, Australia.
**
Assistant Professor, GMU Law School. Ph.D. UCLA Department of Economics; J.D. UCLA
School of Law.
1. Albert Foer, Introduction to Symposium on Buyer Power and Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 505 (2005). The importance of the ‘buyer power’ problem is evidenced by the recent
symposium on that topic in the Antitrust Law Journal. See Symposium, Buyer Power and Antitrust,
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 505 (2005).
2. Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669
(2005), discusses these examples, which involved traditional competition concerns such as
predation.
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said that increased bargaining power on the part of downstream buyers
might create the preconditions for, or be evidence of, abuse of market
power.3
Antitrust authorities around the world have invested substantial
resources in addressing the competitive problems associated with buyer
power in the supermarket industry. In the United States the Federal
Trade Commission recently held a workshop devoted to supermarket
business practices, such as slotting allowances and category
management, as well as the question of supermarket monopoly power.4
Similar inquiries have resulted in Competition Guidelines issued by
agencies in Canada and Israel,5 as well as an OECD investigation.6
Many EU Member States have taken notice of the increasing levels of
retail concentration in their countries.7 This process of change across the
Eurozone has been described as follows:
The European retail industry is currently undergoing a transition. Its
evolution is characterised by an increasing number of mergers, both

3. Foer, supra note 1.
4. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WORKSHOP ON SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE GROCERY
INDUSTRY (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. U.S. authorities have long been interested in
competition issues in supermarkets and the food industry more generally. See Competitive Issues in
Agriculture and the Food Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(1999); Slotting: Fair for Small Business and Consumers?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Small
Business, 106th Cong. (1999); Slotting Fees: Are Family Farmers Battling to Stay on the Farm and
in the Grocery Store?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Small Business, 106th Cong. (2000).
5. See Competition Bureau, Interpretation Bulletin: The Abuse of Dominance Provisions
(Section 78 and 79 of the Competition Act) as Applied to the Canadian Grocery Sector (November
2002) (Can.) [hereinafter Interpretation Bulletin]; The Israel Antitrust Authority, The General
Director’s Position on Commercial Practices Among Dominant Suppliers and Major Retail Chains
(2003) (Isr.) [hereinafter General Director’s Position].
6. OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMM. ON
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, BUYING POWER OF MULTIPRODUCT RETAILERS (1999), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/18/2379299.pdf.
7. An indication of the range of these changes, consider the case of Germany. Twenty-five
years ago, there were around 700 retail companies purchasing directly from the food industry; by
the mid-1980’s this number was 260. By the end of 1999, it had fallen to 115. In 1998, the 5 largest
retail companies had an accumulated market share (based on turnover) of 64%. This share is
forecast to increase to around 75% by 2005. See Ulf Böge, Retailer Power in EC Competition Law,
2001 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 467 (2000) (“Taking into account that the big retail groups also
supply formally independent retailers, it can be said that the entire [German] retail trade is more or
less in the hands of nine retail groups.”). In the U.K., a Report of the Competition Commission
found that 56% of U.K. sales were made to three customers and 68% were made to the largest five
customers. See Competition Commission, Supermarkets: A Report on the Supply of Groceries from
Multiple Stores in the United Kingdom, ¶11.14 (October, 2000) (U.K.) [hereinafter The Competition
Commission Report]. In 1999, the OECD stated that, in at least seven European countries, the top
five grocers accounted for more than 60% of retail sales. OECD, supra note 6, at 16.
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within Member States and across borders, leading to a corresponding
increase in the level of concentration, at the national level and in the
EU as a whole. . . .The number of small, independent retailers has, on
the other hand, been steadily reduced in most Member States. An
historically relatively unconcentrated industry operating along national
lines is thus being transformed into an industry dominated by a small
number of players, each operating in a number of countries.8

Several economic factors are the cause of this increased
consolidation: economies of scale, an ability to buy in bulk, a reduction
in distribution costs, savings in internal organization and logistics, and
the implementation of efficiency-enhancing technological innovations
(e.g., bar-code technology). These factors are reinforced by changes in
consumer purchasing behavior; consumers now prefer to do most of
their shopping in single locations for convenience.9
B. Definition of Buyer Power
The term “buyer power” is often used to describe two distinct
phenomena. It can refer to what economists have traditionally called
“monopsony” power. It can also refer to the concept of bargaining in
markets with a small number of retailers. These two scenarios involve a
fundamental difference in bargaining and market scale and thus require
contextually different economic understandings.
The OECD has defined buyer power as “the ability of a buyer to
influence the terms and conditions on which it purchases goods,” thus
implicitly adopting the latter definition rather than monopsony power.10
8. Joachim Lücking, Retailer Power in EC Competition Law, 2001 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
467 at 473. See also Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Law, at 6,
COM (96) 721 final (January, 1997) [hereinafter Commission’s Green Paper].
9. See Louis Vogel, Competition Law and Buying Power, 19(1) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
4, 5-6 (1998). This process has been noticed by the European Commission in a recent retail-level
merger case:
In the retail trade there is a close interdependence between the distribution market and
the procurement market. Retailers’ share of the distribution market determines their
procurement volume: the bigger the retailer’s share of the distribution market, the larger
the procurement volume. And the larger the procurement volume, the more favourable
as a rule are the buying conditions which the trader obtains from his suppliers.
Favourable buying conditions can in turn be used in various ways to improve one’s
position in the distribution market (sometimes through internal or external growth, but
also through low-price strategies targeted at competitors). The improved position in the
distribution market is itself reflected in a further improvement in buying conditions, and
so on. The spiral described above leads to ever-higher concentration both in distribution
markets and in procurement markets.
Commission Decision 1999/674, Rewe/Meinl, 1999 O.J. (L 274) 1, 12 (EC).
10. OECD, supra note 6 at 18. For a similar definition, see Margaret Bloom, Retailer Buyer
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In other words, the policy concern is created by the existence of fewagent bargaining in retail markets. The root concern expressed by the
OECD is the extent to which few-agent bargaining will result in
different terms in conditions for input suppliers. Note, however, that
price discrimination is an unavoidable outcome of few-agent bargaining
situations, where outcomes depend on relative bargaining abilities. This
has implications for that part of antitrust law (on both sides of the
Atlantic) which seeks to forbid price discrimination, a practice which,
existing statutory preclusions notwithstanding, economic theory tells us
has virtually no negative welfare effects.11 It is perhaps no coincidence
that the rise of large wholesalers and retailers such as the Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Company led in the United States to the passing of the
conceptually discredited and largely unenforced Robinson-Patman Act.12
C. Summary of the Argument
The argument of this paper is simple: from an economic policy
point of view, there is nothing special about market power on the buyer
side of markets. In particular, we reject the contention that retail sector
buying power requires different treatment from antitrust authorities
compared to other sectors in the economy. Likewise, we find arguments
contending that ‘buyer power’ requires that new or different laws be
enacted or judicially developed ultimately unpersuasive.
This paper is divided into three parts. Part I summarizes the
relevant economics of buyer power, and more generally, monopsony.
Part II compares the relevant antitrust treatment, in the U.S. and Europe,
with respect to buyer power and competition policy. Part III applies our
legal and economic insights to supermarket competition.

Power, 2001 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 399 (2000).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2005); Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002,
2002 O.J. (C325) 65 [hereinafter Treaty].
12. The criticism against the Act has been consistent. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 382 (1978) (describing the RobinsonPatman Act as “antitrust’s least glorious hour” and “the misshapen progeny of intolerable
draftsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic theory”); RICHARD POSNER, THE ROBINSONPATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES (1976); and William Baxter, A
Parable, 23 STAN. L. REV. 973 (1971). More recently, the Antitrust Modernization Commission
has announced that it will take up the question of whether the Act should be repealed. Prominent
antitrust scholar Professor Herbert Hovenkamp testified to the Antitrust Modernization Committee
that “as a matter of competition policy, the Robinson-Patman Act is unnecessary and should be
repealed.” Robinson-Patman Act: Hearing Before Antitrust Modernizations Commission, (2005)
(written
statement
of
Prof.
Herbert
Hovenkamp)
available
at
http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/Hovenkamp.pdf).
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF BUYER POWER
In this Part we explain the economics applicable to a proper
understanding of the issues commonly falling under the rubric “buyer
power.” Since policy concerns in this area invariably involve market
power in upstream buyer markets, we first explain the economics of
vertical industries. We then examine the possibility of the unilateral
exercise of buyer power in the form of “raising rivals’ costs,” a
competitive threat which is often raised as a policy concern in this
context, concluding that it offers no special problem for antitrust policy.
We then turn to the relevant economics of the second form of “buyer
power:” bargaining and competition within few-agent market
environments.
A. Preliminary Point
In theory, there is no reason to exclude the issue of buyer power at
the final retail level, that is to say retail shoppers, from our analysis.
However, in practice this issue does not arise frequently. The issue of
“buyer power” is raised most often within the context of vertical
restraints and allegedly exclusionary conduct, and within that context
forms a rubric under which many distinct practices might be subsumed.
Many of the practices mentioned in the “buyer power” literature are
well-known to economists and antitrust lawyers, and it is economically
questionable whether anything is added by subsuming them under such a
broad rubric:
I recognize that when scholars or practitioners call for assessing buyer
power differently from seller power, they may be using these labels as
shorthand for particular industries or for certain industry
characteristics. However, it is important to understand what those
fundamental economic characteristics might be and incorporate them
explicitly into the analysis. Doing so allows for sharper thinking.
Sound antitrust policy demands this, and would be undermined by
framing distinctions based on the ‘buyer’ or ‘seller’ labels.13

Alternatively, the live issue from a competition policy perspective
is whether there exists a separate category of “concern” to which the
label “buyer power” applies distinct from those already known within

13. Marius Schwartz, Should Antitrust Assess Buyer Market Power Differently than Seller
Market Power?, Statement at the DOJ/ FTC Workshop on Merger Enforcement, February 17, 2004,
available at www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217schwartz.pdf.
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the economics of vertical restraints and exclusionary conduct.14 The
only available candidate for such possible concern is changes in relative
bargaining power. We do not find this answer persuasive.
B. Vertical Restraints
In this subsection we briefly summarize the state of economic
learning in the area of vertical restraints, which, over the last 50 years,
has significantly influenced the attitude of antitrust authorities.
Vertical contractual relationships exist between upstream (input)
suppliers and downstream (retail) firms in most markets. Markets are
generally characterized by at least two layers of supply, and in some
sophisticated-good industries, more than two levels. Vertical relations in
the supply of goods is one characteristic that distinguishes modern
capitalism from the artisanal or guild production that characterized the
market in Western Europe before the Industrial Revolution.15 The
economics of vertical contractual relationships between manufacturers
as input suppliers, and retailers as buyers must inform sensible antitrust
policy.
1. Basic Welfare Lesson
A basic lesson of the economics of vertical restraints, and
exclusionary conduct in general, is that antitrust analysis need only be
concerned with the welfare of the final consumer.16 The end-customer
only cares about the quality, quantity, and price of the final product.
What transpires upstream in the process of producing the final product is
irrelevant to the consumer of the final good. While the history of

14. Peter Carstensen is a leading proponent of this view. See Peter Carstensen, Buyer Power
and Merger Analysis – The Need for Different Metrics, Statement at the DOJ/ FTC Merger
Workshop (Feb. 17, 2004), available at www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/
040217carstensen.pdf.
See also Peter Carstensen, Concentration and the Destruction of
Competition in Agricultural Markets: The Case for Change in Public Policy, 2000 WISC. L. REV.
531 (2000).
15. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1786). See especially ibid. Book 1, ¶ 1.3. for Smith’s famous description of the concept of the
division of labor through the example of a pin factory.
16. Compare Salop, supra note 2 and John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary
Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and
Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2005) with Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Monopsony and the
Ross-Simmons Case: A Comment on Salop and Kirkwood, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 717 (2005) (arguing
for an efficiency standard in lieu of a consumer welfare standard). The obvious difference between
the two standards is that harm to competitors would “count” for the purposes of the efficiency
standard, but not the consumer welfare standard.
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antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe has evinced much
suspicion of specific contractual relationships or organizational forms
between upstream firms and downstream retailers, such as vertical
integration, input price-discrimination, “foreclosure,” “retail price
maintenance,” “margin squeeze,” “raising rivals’ costs,” and so on, it is
now recognized in modern economics (and increasingly - though not yet
entirely - in competition law) that most such practices, considered in
themselves, are generally benign from the point of view of end-customer
welfare, and only potentially anticompetitive (from the point of view of
actual or possible exclusion) under a narrow set of conditions.
2. Monopsony
While the most familiar examples of exclusionary conduct involve
cases of upstream input suppliers foreclosing rivals from access to a
critical input, monopsony analysis turns this exactly backwards. As
monopoly is to the seller context, so “monopsony” is to the buyer
context. It is the pure case of only one firm existing as a buyer for some
upstream input. In the real world such a pure case is rare, but an example
might be (in the short-run) a small town with few other employment
opportunities whose inhabitants sell their labor to a local coal mine. The
economics of monopsony are analytically identical to the economics of
monopoly.17 Where the monopolist directly withholds supply for the
purpose of raising price (which of course reduces welfare), a
monopsonist achieves the same ultimate effect indirectly simply by
refusing to buy more inputs. If a firm is simultaneously a monopsonist
(towards input suppliers) and a monopolist (towards final customers),
then, in this mostly textbook-only example, there would result a double
retraction in final supply.
3. The Dual Monopoly Problem
The situation of the simultaneous monopolist/monopsonist is
analytically identical to the familiar problem of double marginalization.
This problem occurs in industries characterized by an upstream
monopolist supplier and a downstream monopolist retailer. This “double
marginalization problem” also leads to a double contraction of final
output and therefore results in a greater efficiency reduction than one
would observe if monopoly conditions persisted over only one level. It is
17. See, e.g., R. G. Noll, Buyer Power and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 591
(2005) (“Asymmetric treatment of monopoly and monopsony has no basis in economic analysis.”).
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a basic insight of economics in the context of vertical contractual
relations that an upstream monopolist firm can never do better than just
the one monopoly market power and will generally seek to increase
output to the joint profit maximizing level such that a surplus would be
created which could be shared by both firms. This is not to say that the
upstream firm might not seek to maintain a pre-existing monopoly in
order to extend the duration of monopoly.18 Generally, however, the
upstream firm increases profits by internalizing the retailer’s ability to
place a second mark-up on the product. An obvious way to capture this
surplus is through vertical merger of the supplier and downstream
retailer, which increases consumer welfare.19 The practice of vertical
integration, once looked upon suspiciously by competition authorities in
merger analysis, is now, for this and other reasons, regarded as generally
benign.20
As a substitute to vertical integration, manufacturers and retailers
will frequently seek to align incentives by contract. These contracts will
frequently involve the supplier delegating distribution and promotion
tasks to a retailer. The agent’s incentives to promote and distribute the
principal’s product are not the same as the principal’s incentives: the
parties require some means of ensuring that the agent performs the
delegated tasks as though they were his own. In the business world,
countless new and ingenious methods can be found by which contractual
parties in principal/agent commercial contexts seek to align incentives
through self-enforcing mechanisms.21 The wedge in incentives that
generally exists in the principal/agent context is especially important in
vertically structured industries, and pervasive in the retail sector, as will
be seen below in the discussion of slotting allowances and category
management.22
C. Raising Rivals’ Costs
The issue of “raising rivals’ costs” inevitably arises in the literature
18. See infra Section II.C (discussing this possibility).
19. Horizontal mergers of firms producing complements will also have the effect of
internalizing this double margin to the benefit of consumers.
20. The issue of vertical integration is ineradicably linked to the broader issues of the firmboundary problem and efficient contracting, much of which is outside the scope of this paper.
21. See generally, Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. AND ECON. 265 (1985).
22. For the theoretical locus classicus of moral hazard see Grossman & Hart, An Analysis of
the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983). An excellent and less technical
description of the theory, with business examples and extensions, can be found in MILGROM &
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1992).
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on “buyer power” perhaps because it is a concept based on the
exploitation of market power with respect to input markets. In the
monopsony context, raising rivals’ costs refers to the possibility that a
“power-buyer” might exploit that power in input markets.23 Salop
considers “raising rivals’ costs” through overbuying of inputs as a
strategy that is potentially consumer-welfare decreasing because it may
result in the ability to exercise market power in the final goods market.24
The concept of “raising rivals’ costs” (RRC) is simple: large,
incumbent firms sometimes may have an incentive to raise the costs of
competitors within the industry in which they operate. This might be true
even if the action that raises their rivals’ costs also raises their own: the
crux of the issue is the asymmetry in cost structure between the
incumbent and its competitors. The RRC concept, that a firm with
market power might be able to affect prices in the industry’s input
markets with exclusionary effect, encompasses many possible types of
behaviour. The list of practices that might potentially raise rivals’ costs
is large, and includes a wide spectrum of conduct ranging from lowering
prices to blowing up a rivals’ factory. Whether it makes sense to
subsume them under a “catch-all” RRC rubric is arguable.25 One
possible classification of this large set of possible behaviour involves
vertical versus horizontal relations. With respect to horizontal relations,
a further classification might be that rivals’ costs can be raised both
directly and indirectly. For our purposes, we focus on unilateral vertical
“overbuying,” and exclude collusive endeavours which can be separately
challenged under Sherman Act Section 1 or analogous price-fixing
prohibitions.
The RRC concept is frequently invoked in claims that an upstream
monopolist’s input purchases exclude rivals.26 RRC overbuying, as
23. Salop, supra note 2, at 671.
24. Salop also analyzes the possibility of predatory overbuying, that is, overbuying aimed at
gaining monopsony power in the input market rather than attempting to achieve market power in the
output market. Id. at 675. Salop concludes that successful predatory overbuying “does not
necessarily harm consumers,” and the likelihood of consumer harm from predatory overbuying is
smaller than its output market counter-part, namely predatory pricing. Id. at 671, 676. Further, a
successful predatory overbuying strategy would be quite difficult to identify and distinguish from
the normal competitive process. See Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for
Distribution on the Merits, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119 (2003) [hereinafter KLEIN]. Our analysis
focuses on the RRC variety of overbuying.
25. See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 491 (2004) (“To
sum up, raising rivals’ costs theories provide a concept that encompasses many very different
practices. Due to the specificities of such practices, I have preferred to deal with them separately.”).
26. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19,
31-32 (1987).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 6
SCHEELINGS1.DOC

216

3/20/2006 9:17:25 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:207

Salop defines it, requires a firm with monopsony power to increase input
purchases and, in turn, the input prices faced by its rivals, in order
ultimately to increase its ability to raise prices in the output market.27
RRC overbuying may involve “foreclosure” of rivals from these inputs
or else enabling these rivals to suffer a “price squeeze,”28 a term usually
applied to the reverse case of an upstream monopolistic wholesaler
simultaneously integrated with some (not all) downstream retailers, and
which sells its input (which must be an “essential” input) to the other,
competing downstream retailers at a price higher than what it charges its
own downstream component.29 Another proposed model in the RRC
literature considers an upstream wholesaler writes exclusive-dealing
contracts with established downstream retailers, which forces an
entering wholesaler to use or establish an independent, possibly less
efficient, retail supply in order to compete.30 However, in this latter
example, the original model was shown to be improperly specified.31
Once corrected, the practices shadowed by possible impugnation in fact
were shown to be welfare-improving. The finding of the welfarebenignancy of this example is an instantiation of what is now known to
be a general truth for vertical practices, namely, that they are invariably
efficiency-enhancing. This is an economic fact which was during the
1980s gradually accepted by US competition authorities, and, in Europe,
accepted eventually also (albeit much later) by the Commission, as is
verified by the Commission’s introduction in 1999 of block exemptions
for vertical relations.32
With respect to its application to vertically-related industries, the
RRC concept, while it increases our knowledge of the possibility of
anticompetitive overbuying, requires restrictive conditions not likely to
apply in many retail settings. For instance, a classic example is that of
slotting allowances (payments for premium supermarket shelf space).33
27. Id.
28. This practice is sometimes also called a ‘margin squeeze’.
29. Foreclosure-type arguments always require a vertically integrated upstream monopolist
for threshold validity. For a complete examination of the very restrictive conditions necessary for
vertical practices to be able to be said to be (social) welfare reducing, see Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole,
A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, VOL. III (Armstrong and
Porter eds. 2003).
30. William S. Comanor & H.E. Frech, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements? 75
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 541 (1985); Frank G. Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Competitive
Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1057 (1987).
31. See Marius Schwartz, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 1063 (1987); Mathewson & Winter, supra note 30.
32. RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 614 (2003) [hereinafter WHISH].
33. Infra Section III.B.1.
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Some argue that product manufacturers, purchasing a large share of
supermarket shelf space, might raise the cost of retail distribution for
rivals, thereby increasing the dominant firm’s ability to raise prices or
restrict output. The fundamental economic response to that concern is
that slotting allowances raise the cost of distribution for everybody – and
firms compete for retail distribution on a level playing field.34 In
addition, one condition common to RRC models is that large economies
of scale must be present in the production of the upstream good, a
feature that is not present in many markets where slotting allowances
and similar input purchases are observed.
It is certainly theoretically plausible for an incumbent firm to bid
up the price of an input (say, wages) within an industry which affects all
other firms in that industry. If the other firms are more labour intensive,
then their input costs will have been disproportionately affected vis-à-vis
the incumbent firm. While such a strategy lowers aggregate profits in the
industry, the disproportionate effect on costs between incumbent and
fringe may lead to the incumbent’s market share increasing sufficiently
such that its profit increases. Whether such a scenario could occur in
practice would depend on the relative elasticities of aggregate demand,
residual firm demands, and individual firm costs.35
However, in terms of antitrust enforcement, it remains unclear
whether the rare cases in which this model might become relevant
justify, from a cost/benefit point of view, antitrust intervention at all.36
The risk of false positives is significant, since it is very difficult to
distinguish RRC overbuying from legitimate competition for
distribution. This risk is exacerbated by the lack of economic
knowledge regarding the potentially pro-competitive dimensions of
many of these practices.
From an economic perspective, there exists a substantive difference
34. See Benjamin Klein & Joshua Wright, The Economics of Slotting Arrangements
(forthcoming), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=773464. Klein and
Wright argue that slotting allowances result in high manufacturer margin products because retailers
do not have the incentive to supply the jointly profit-maximizing level of promotional inputs such as
shelf space. See also Klein, supra note 24, 122-28, for a summary of the economic conditions under
which exclusive distribution contracts, a more restrictive form of slotting, may cause
anticompetitive effects.
35. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 (2) AM. ECON.
REV. 269 (Papers and Proceedings, 1983).
36. See David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, 20 Years of Raising Rivals’ Costs, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 371 (2003). Conditions for empirically testing the theory are given in Janusz
A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, VOL. I (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig, eds., Elsevier Science
Publishers B.V. 1989).
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between direct effects on the one hand, and (market-based) indirect
effects on the other. The former involve real externalities, and the
remedy for such cases has always been properly defined and enforced
proprietary rights or liability rules.37 The latter involve pecuniary
externalities, and it has long been the tradition within welfare
economics38 that such within-market externalities, while equally
derogative of first-best efficiency from the point of view of perfect
competition,39 ought not to be a concern of real-world government and
judicial policy.40 In antitrust parlance, this is the classic distinction
between protecting competition versus protecting competitors.41
Finally, the canonical RRC overbuying model depends on the
asymmetry of costs between incumbent and fringe. It is a static, snapshot model which begs the question of how such cost advantages were
acquired and why the firm which acquired them ought not be permitted
to extract the surplus (or rents) of its innovation (or first mover
advantage) through – modulo the existence of antitrust law - legal
market activity.42
D. The Economics of Bargaining Markets
Standard models of monopoly/monopsony assume a single large
agent on one side of the market and many, anonymous, output-negligible
(technically: atomless43), agents on the other. However, this paradigm is

37. See Michael I. Krauss, Property Rules v Liability Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (B. Boukaert & G. De Geest eds., Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 1999), available at
http://classweb.gmu.edu/mkrauss/prop-liab.htm.
38. See Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON. 143 (1954).
39. See Makowski and Ostroy, Appropriation and Efficiency: A Revision of the First Theorem
of Welfare Economics, 85 (4) AM. ECON. REV. 808 (1995).
40. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 352 (1995). Traditionally,
the common law has seemed implicitly to agree with this welfare assessment. To give one example,
the common law constrains the scope of tort doctrine in the context of pure financial loss. See the
House of Lords’ “direct reliance” test (stronger than the “reasonably foreseeable” test), Williams v.
Natural Life [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830 (U.K.). See generally, LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN
EUROPE: FRONTIERS OF TORT LAW (Bussani & Palmer eds. 2004) (showing that an awareness of the
importance of this distinction appears to be common across the legal families of Europe).
41. Scholars have often remarked on the different approaches to the importance of this
distinction in the United States and Europe. See, e.g., Eleanor Fox, We Protect Competition, You
Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 149 (2003).
42. See, e.g., Louis Makowski, Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion, and the
Organization of Economic Activity, 22 (2) J. ECON. THEORY 222 (1980), for modern economics’
take on the relationship between ‘free’ entry, the ‘zero profit condition,’ proprietary rights,
innovation, and the relation (or not) of all these to the concept of perfect competition.
43. Robert J. Aumann, Markets with a Continuum of Traders, 32 ECONOMETRICA 39 , 50
(1964).
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irrelevant to the current concern in policy circles, which focuses on the
context of a few, large, non-anonymous agents on both sides of the
market.44 Accordingly, the concern is with relative changes in bargaining
power on one or the other side of the market.
1. Small Versus Large Markets45
All markets are comprised of bilateral contracts. In large markets,
economists focus on aggregate market variables (market price, quantity,
etc.) rather than on the individual-agent level, both because such
individual-agent level contracting is anonymous as well as because the
absence or presence of any one contracting pair does not (observably)
impact upon aggregate market variables.
In a market with only a small number of possible contracting pairs,
avoidance of the individual-agent level is no longer an option, since the
aggregate market price is directly determined by the bargaining at this
level. While a number of theories of bargaining exist,46 economic theory
does not enable price-predictions with respect to the specific institutional
case of bilateral-monopoly bargaining. All possible prices within the
lens of trade are candidate outcomes. Theory does tell us that in
monopolistic bilateral-bargaining situations, firms might invest in
bargaining pre-commitments or otherwise seek to enhance their
bargaining position, especially when there is the possibility of ex post
hold-up, or when relationship-specific investment is involved.47
2. The Assignment Model
If a buyer values a widget at 5 euros, while it cost the seller 2 euros
to make, then the “lens of trade” is the difference between these two
amounts, namely, 3 euros.48 The ultimate price will divide this surplus
44. See, e.g., Foer, supra note 1 (introducing symposium discussion on buyer power).
45. Professor Inderst mentions two cases: the “market interface paradigm” and the
“negotiation interface paradigm.” See Roman Inderst, Buyer Power A theorist’s perspective,
(Presentation given at U.K. Competition Commission (Jan. 2005)) available at
http://faculty.insead.edu/inderst/personalwebpage/bp_inderst.pdf (last visited 2/12/2006).
46. The details of these solutions are not germane to the paper. A general discussion can be
found at Michael Maschler, The Bargaining Set, Kernel and Nucleolus, in Aumann and Hart (eds.)
HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS (R.J. Aumann & S. Hart eds.,
Elsevier Schince Publishers B.V. 1992).
47. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 (4) AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); Thomas Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM.
ECON. REV. 281 (1956).
48. We assume (which is definitional for the “assignment model”), that the buyer only wants
one widget, and the seller only has one to sell.
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between the two participants. Obviously, the buyer maximizes his
surplus from the transaction by buying the widget for 2 euros, while the
seller maximizes her surplus by selling it at 5 euros. Anything in
between is also possible, and where the final price will reside depends
on the relative bargaining power of the two agents to the transaction. If
there exist other buyers who also value the widget then we no longer
have a situation of bilateral-monopoly bargaining but instead have a oneto-many bargaining situation, more commonly known as an auction. The
widget will be sold to the buyer with the highest valuation, thus enabling
the seller to extract nearly the entire surplus from the transaction. If all
the buyers have the same valuation, then the seller is a perfectly
competitive monopolist who extracts all the surplus. Of course, the
example could be reversed so that we have many-to-one bargaining,
such that it is the buyer who is a monopolist facing many sellers. Again
an auction would be used, and again the buyer would extract all (if a
perfect competitor) or nearly all the surplus from the transaction.
Continuing in this manner of adding more buyers and sellers to the basic
bargaining model,49 with many agents on both sides of the market, we
would have the many-to-many bargaining situation of the double-sided
auction, such as in stock markets and many other real-world examples.50
a. Primary Lesson
The primary lesson from this assignment model is that there is an
inherent link in markets, regardless of their size, between bargaining
power and competition. In particular, bargaining power depends on the
competition (in the sense of relative substitutability51) that exists on your
side of the market. In other words, the existence of rival buyers with
valuations close to your own will render your bargaining power largely
irrelevant.
The preceding example was one of full information, such that both
buyer and seller know each other’s walk-away value. This was sufficient
to reveal the fundamental relationship between bargaining and
49. Replicating the market in this way eventually leads to modern models of perfect
competition. For a quick introduction see the preface by Andreu Mas-Colell, Non-Cooperative
Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition: Presentation, 22 J. ECON. THEORY 121 (1980).
50. Of course a stock market involves divisible goods, rather than the discrete case required
by the assignment model (indeed, one of the many purposes of a stock market is to create
divisibility). However, this detail does not upset the basic logic of the model.
51. Theoretical models of competition depend crucially on assumptions made about relative
substitutability on either side of the market. Those details are beyond the scope of this article. Of
course, agents are complementary across the sides of the market since buyers need sellers and vice
versa.
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competition. Of course, in the real world, this is not likely to be the case:
such values (valuable to both agents) are “private information.” If there
exist other buyers with private valuations of the widget (either higher,
lower or the same as the valuation of the first buyer), then, as before, the
seller will hold an auction. From the seller’s point of view, the beauty of
an auction is that she need not know the private valuations of the buyers.
The auction will make them reveal it for her and the widget will be sold
to the buyer with the highest valuation, thus enabling her to extract
nearly all the surplus.52 If all of the buyers have the same valuation, then
the seller is a perfectly competitive monopolist who extracts the entire
surplus.53
b. Ancillary Lessons
Two further lessons from this example are that competition forces
agents to reveal valuable private information involuntarily (known as
informational efficiency), and that there exists a fundamental link
between perfect competition and full surplus extraction (known as full
appropriation). Since auctions are a means of price discrimination, the
first lesson has efficiency implications for the legal proscription of this
practice (still found in competition texts). The second lesson has
implications for the oft-described “tension” between competition law
and intellectual property, since it is well-known in the economics of
intellectual property that full appropriation is a necessary condition for
optimal R&D investment.
3. Substitutes versus Complements
While substitutability is a necessary condition for competition (and
bad for bargaining power), complementarity is a necessary condition for
efficient organizational form (such as the existence of firms,54 or the

52. Some rents are left to the buyer due to her monopoly in her private information.
53. Theoretically speaking, perfect competition is a concept that depends on relative
substitutability, not numbers per se (this is actually a slightly complicated issue, the details of which
are not germane to this article). In this last case of a monopolist seller and multiple, identical buyers,
the indispensability of the seller to the transaction (there is only one of her) means that she
“deserves” the whole surplus (under the Shapley value criterion where what you get is what you
contribute). An agent who has an identical doppelgaenger in the economy contributes nothing to the
transaction and thus “deserves” zero surplus. See Lloyd S.Shapley, A Value for N-Person Games, in
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES (Kuhn & Tucker eds.,1953).
54. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119 (1990).
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desirability of mergers and joint ventures).55 The presence of
complements, such as network effects, on either side of the market,
impacts standard efficiency results. Recently, these complementarities
are properly the focus of investigation by economists, especially with
respect to the theory of the firm.56 The basic lesson is that
complementarity should exist under the one institutional form.
A further lesson is that the relationship between buyers and sellers
is one of complementarity, not substitutability. Put simply, buyers and
sellers aren’t competing with each other. Buyers need sellers and sellers
need buyers.
E. Applying the Lessons
The basic bargaining paradigm described in the previous subsection
has implications for our analysis of some of the issues raised in the
literature on buyer power. We briefly consider some of those
implications here.
1. Assessing Mergers and “Countervailing” Buyer-Power
When two buyer-firms merge there is an obvious reduction in the
upstream sellers’ relative bargaining power. Increases of “buyer power”
and “bargaining power” often refer to the standard notion within merger
law of a reduction in competition. While reductions in bargaining power
correlate with a reduction in competition, it is only the latter that matters
for competition law purposes. We are careful to note here that our
analysis applies generally to unilateral abuses of market power, rather
than buyer-side collusion.57
Similarly, the “countervailing power”58 argument makes sense only
if its purpose is simply to serve as a proxy concept for the recognition
that the market under investigation involves few participants on either

55. See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1996).
56. See Ilya Segal, Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining, 70
REV. ECON. STUD. 439 (2003), for the most recent and general analysis.
57. The argument that buyer-side mergers should be more highly scrutinized than seller-side
mergers, particularly in agricultural markets, is presented by Carstensen, supra note 14. Carstensen
argues that antitrust treatment of buyer power should be designed in a manner that is sensitive to the
differences in the economic incentives to collude or unilaterally exercise monopsony power
between buyers and sellers. Id. We certainly agree that antitrust agencies should be aware of any
such differences. We claim only that antitrust need not develop special rules for assessing the
consumer-welfare dangers associated with the exercise of buyer power.
58. DOBSON CONSULTING, BUYER POWER AND ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION IN THE FOOD
RETAIL DISTRIBUTION SECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 19 (1999) [hereinafter DOBSON REPORT].
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side. In that light, the label brings competition law in accord with the
commercial law presumption that the law will not intervene in
negotiations amongst experienced market participants.59 Any other use
of the concept suffers, because, from the point of view of economic
efficiency, market power on one side of the market is not ameliorated by
the presence of market power on the other side.
2. Monopolization
Neither Treaty Article 82 nor Section 2 of the Sherman Act
explicitly create a special category of antitrust analysis for “abuse” or
“monopolization” involving firms that seek or invest in increased
bargaining power vis-à-vis firms across from them in the market. Nor is
it the role of competition law to regulate relative bargaining power
between consenting adults in market environments. Common law
contract jurisprudence is strongly averse to legal paternalism toward the
arms-length (and lawyer assisted) negotiations between sophisticated,
experienced market participants. It is questionable what policy would be
served by allowing competition law to play a role in regulating any
asymmetries of bargaining power between sophisticated parties. It is
worth noting that many cases involving buyer exercise of monopoly
power are attempts to facilitate an upstream cartel or involve allegations
of conspiracy rather than unilateral anti-competitive overbuying.60
3. Innovation
One reason given for why “buyer power” should be regarded as
different from “seller power” is that, in the long run, buyer power may
have adverse effects on sellers’ incentives to innovate.61 It has been
59. See Dan O’Brien & Greg Shaffer, Bargaining, Bundling and Clout: The Portfolio effects
of Horizontal Mergers (Fed, Trade Commission, Working Paper No. 266, 2003) (showing that
changes in bargaining power upstream, while often leading to transfers in welfare, are rarely a
welfare concern from a social point of view).
60. See, e.g, Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000); Klor’s, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); and Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208 (1939).
61. DOBSON REPORT, supra note 59.
[Its effect is to] prevent manufacturers from exploiting their position as fully as thy could
do if they were faced with a less concentrated retail sector. . .[and] force manufacturers
to reduce investment in new products or product improvements, advertising and brand
building, eliminate secondary brands and weaken primary brands while strengthening he
position of private label brands, and in the process cause wholesale prices to small
retailers to rise, further weakening them as competitors. . .
Id. (emphasis added)
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shown that this relationship is in fact unclear,62 which is unsurprising,
given that innovation is a means of competition via increasing
complementarity (and indispensability), and so determinations of net
efficiency depend on the relative balance of efficiencies from exploited
complementaries versus inefficiencies from reduced substitutabilities (or
competition). Here at least is a sense in which it could be said that
“seller power,” when it is in the context of a seller facing atomless endconsumers, differs from “buyer power,” when it is in the context of a
buyer facing a small number of other (upstream) firms: that firms in the
latter case have available to them an additional means of competition
which end-consumers do not. Namely, competition exists not just among
substitute possibilities, but among complement possibilities. And
competition with respect to complements is achieved via investment and
innovation. And of course, this is not a difference which increases the
intellectual case for antitrust intervention against upstream-located firms.
III. ANTITRUST LAW AND BUYER POWER
In this Part we detail the law relating to “buyer power,” dealing in
turn with both the US and the European legal regimes. It should be
noted initially that in terms of antitrust enforcement, the issue of “buyer
power” can arise both at the assessment of “dominance” (or monopoly)
stage and at the “abuse” or “monopolization” stage. We limit the scope
of our analysis to the exercise of monopsony power which has the effect
of achieving or maintaining monopsony power.
We exclude
considerations of retail-level collusion since such conduct is uniformly
prohibited by both regimes, and unequivocally decreases consumer
welfare.63

The Commission has said the same thing, namely that a “dominant buyer determines the success or
otherwise of product innovations.” Rewe/Meinl, supra note 9.
62. Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives, CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 3547 (2002) found that a seller’s incentive to innovate may actually increase in the ‘size’
of the buyer.
63. This exclusion means that cases like Toys “R” US, 221 F.3d 928, where it was alleged
that Toys “R” Us facilitated a conspiracy among toy manufacturers, are outside the scope of our
analysis. Collusive attempts at the exercise of monopsony power should be familiar to students of
American antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc.,
190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999).
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A. United States
The exercise of monopsony power, like its monopoly counterpart,
must be distinguished from its mere presence as the result of accident or
superior skill for the purposes of antitrust analysis.64 The fundamental
economic objection to the exercise of monopsony power is that it harms
consumers in the final output market. Consistent with this concern,
Salop points out that American courts and federal agencies have adopted
the consumer welfare standard, focusing on the price effects of mergers
and exclusionary conduct, yet the exercise of monopsony power need
not always reduce consumer welfare.65 For example, a buyer-side cartel
of final consumers may reduce aggregate welfare as a result of the
competitive distortion but increase consumer welfare as a result of lower
prices. Courts in the United States have consistently rejected arguments
that conduct which harms competitors while benefiting consumers, even
when the former outweighs the latter in some quantitative sense, violates
the antitrust laws.66
1. Exclusion
Allegedly exclusionary buyer conduct must satisfy the standards set
forth in Sherman Antitrust Act Section 2, which generally requires the
plaintiff to present evidence that the defendant’s conduct injured
consumers.67 In conventional, seller-side, exclusion cases, American
courts generally require the plaintiff to establish seller market power, the
degree of foreclosure, the costs imposed on foreclosed rivals wishing to
realign supply contracts with other buyers or new entrants, and the
length of the exclusionary agreements.68
Salop’s recent analysis of anticompetitive overbuying by power
buyers extends this analysis to buyer-power-driven exclusion by
proposing a four-step rule of reason standard that is generally consistent
64. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) (“large-scale buying is not,
of course, unlawful per se . . . . It may not, however, be used to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize interstate trade or commerce.”).
65. Salop, supra note 2, at 689.
66. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984). See also
supra note 2, at 685-689 (discussing the Kartell case).
67. Sherman Anti-Trust Act §2, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975).
68. See, e.g., PepsiCo., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y 2000), aff’d per
curiam, 315 F.3d 101, 111 (2002); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp.
2d 362 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (“RJR II”); aff’d per curiam, 67 Fed. Appx. 810 (4th Cir. 2003); Concord
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000); Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v.
British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001); Omega Envtl, Inc. v. Gilbarco Co., 127 F.3d
1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1997).
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with the approach taken by American courts and antitrust agencies in
monopolization cases.69 Salop proposes that the rule of reason analysis
require the plaintiff alleging anticompetitive power-buying behavior to
show: (1) artificially inflated input purchasing by a defendant with buyer
power; (2) injury to competitors; (3) achievement of market power by
the defendant; and (4) consumer harm.70
The first step requires the plaintiff to set forth facts establishing that
the defendant has artificially increased its purchasing activities in the
input market such that input prices have actually increased.71 Under
Salop’s rubric, evidence that the increased input prices serve some procompetitive purpose would suffice to grant the defendant summary
judgment in the absence of clear evidence of consumer harm.72 This is
not unlike the “conduct” element in a typical Section 2 monopolization
case.
The second step requires the plaintiff to show that a rival was
actually injured by the increase in input prices.73 A plaintiff would be
required to present evidence that the defendant’s overbuying raised the
plaintiff’s costs. Essentially, this question turns on whether the rival is
disadvantaged by the defendant’s input purchases or whether the rival is
able to find competitively priced substitute inputs. Injury to the rival, as
discussed above, should also include evidence that significant economies
of scale prevail in the market for the final good.
The third step would require the plaintiff to present evidence that
the defendant had buyer-side monopoly power, although Salop asserts
that monopsony power is not a necessary condition for anticompetitive
overbuying.74 U.S. antitrust law is clear that buyer power is to be treated
similarly to monopoly power, and courts have uniformly required
monopsony power in buyer-side monopolization cases.75 As with
monopoly power, plaintiffs would likely be able to prove monopsony
power by calculating market shares in a properly-defined relevant
market. In an appropriate case, direct evidence of monopsony power
69. See sources cited supra note 68.
70. Salop, supra note 2, at 690-691.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 907 F.2d 510, 514-16 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
claim that defendants had monopsony power in federal cattle procurement market); United States v.
Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663-71 (9th Cir. 1990) (first run movie screens in Las Vegas did not
have monopsony power); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Companies, No. 00CV01235, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16909, at *54 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (rejecting motion to dismiss because of allegations that
defendant controlled 65% of the tobacco purchasing market).
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might be available.
Finally, a plaintiff would be required to show that the defendant’s
alleged exercise of buyer power resulted in a reduction in consumer
welfare.76 Like step one, the analysis of consumer harm would take into
account any plausible pro-competitive justifications offered for the
overbuying practice. Insistence upon a showing of actual consumer
harm is central to a sensible antitrust policy with respect to buyer power.
This requirement is a minimal safeguard necessary to ensure that procompetitive practices are not prohibited because their consumer-welfareincreasing properties are not well understood by courts and agencies.
The burden of proof must be allocated to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant’s exercise of buyer power caused harm to consumers in a
measurable way, i.e. raising output prices or decreasing output quality.
2. Mergers
There is a long history of antitrust enforcement in retail markets,
and particularly supermarkets, in the United States. One now infamous
decision in a line of expansive interpretations of Clayton Act § 7
includes United States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,77 a decision argued by
none other than Richard Posner and Warren Christopher. The decision
prohibited a merger between two grocery chains controlling only 7.5%
of Los Angeles grocery sales post-merger and prompted Justice
Stewart’s famous observation that “the sole consistency that I can find is
that under § 7, the Government always wins.”78 A more recent example
of modern merger analysis between two powerful retailers is FTC v.
Staples, Inc., where the government was able to use direct econometric
evidence to simultaneously show that: (1) office supply superstores were
a relevant antitrust market; and (2) a merger of the two leading office
supply superstores would significantly increase prices in that market.79
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines set out enforcement policy for
the FTC and DOJ with respect to horizontal mergers, and also present a
76. Id. U.S. antitrust law is clear on the point that consumer welfare guides antitrust policy,
not general efficiency considerations. See Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
77. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Interestingly, Von’s Grocery has been heavily criticized, but like
other outdated merger decisions, never overruled despite empirical evidence that increased
concentration over time in the Los Angeles grocery retail market between 1966-2000 is correlated
with lower, not higher, prices. See Joshua Wright, Von’s Grocery and the Concentration-Price
Relationship in Grocery Retail, 48 UCLA L. REV. 743 (2001).
78. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 301.
79. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1966). See RICHARD POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 157-58 (2nd ed. 2001) (describing the Commission’s analysis in Staples as
evidence that the “[e]conomic analysis of mergers had come of age”).
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framework for analyzing the competitive effects of those mergers.80 In
addition to the Merger Guidelines, the FTC and DOJ have also
promulgated “joint venture” guidelines which carry out the identical
function with respect to less complete horizontal integrations.81
The Merger Guidelines adopt a five-step procedure for determining
whether an agency will challenge a particular merger: (1) defining the
relevant market and calculating initial and post-merger concentration
levels; (2) analyzing the competitive effects; (3) assessing entry
considerations; (4) determining whether any merger-specific efficiencies
are present; and (5) determining whether either firm would likely fail
without the merger.82
The Merger Guidelines’ unifying theme is that “mergers should not
be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise.”83 The Merger Guidelines explicitly contemplate mergers that
increase or create market power on the buyer side of the market:
Market power also encompasses the ability of a single buyer (a
‘monopsonist’), a coordinating group of buyers, or a single buyer, not
a monopsonist, to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is
below the competitive price and thereby depress output. The exercise
of market power by buyers (“monopsony power”) has adverse effects
comparable to those associated with the exercise of market power by
sellers. In order to assess potential monopsony concerns, the Agency
will apply an analytical framework analogous to the framework of
these Guidelines.84

The FTC and DOJ Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors (“Joint Venture Guidelines”) also explicitly consider buyer
power issues. For example, they state that: “competitor collaborations
may involve agreements jointly to purchase necessary inputs,” and that
“many such agreements do not raise antitrust concerns and indeed may
be procompetitive.”85 Like the Merger Guidelines, the Joint Venture
Guidelines are concerned that buying collaborations “can create or
increase market power or facilitate its exercise by increasing the ability
or incentive to drive the price of the purchased product, and thereby
80. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1997) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
81. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3 (2000) [hereinafter JOINT VENTURE
GUIDELINES].
82. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 80.
83. Id. at § 0.1.
84. Id.
85. JOINT VENTURE GUIDELINES, see supra note 81.
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depress output, below what likely would prevail in the absence of the
relevant agreement.”86 The key economic question is whether the
exercise of monopsony power will attract new and profitable purchasing
entries that will offset the price reduction.87
Buyer power can be an issue for analysis in both upstream and
downstream mergers.88 With respect to the former, buyer power is often
raised as a defense to claims that an upstream merger will enhance
market power. Of course, mergers between buyers can result in
monopsony power that is itself the subject of antitrust inquiry.
a. Countervailing Power
It is often argued that any potential anticompetitive effects caused
by a merger of suppliers are mitigated by the presence of countervailing
buyer power. Of course, this argument also implies that any merger
between power buyers creating monopsony power requires consideration
of the presence of upstream monopoly power. As discussed, economic
theory does not support the notion that market power at one level of the
distribution chain mitigates the potential exercise of market power at
The Merger Guidelines do not specifically address
another.89
countervailing power, but the issue might arise at either of two stages in
the analysis.
First, “countervailing power” might be considered in the
competitive effects analysis.90 The Merger Guidelines contemplate the
merger of firms that might face a small number of agents on the other
side of the market, i.e. the merger of sellers facing a small number of
buyers or vice versa:
[I]n some markets sellers are primarily distinguished by their relative
advantages in serving different buyers or groups of buyers, and buyers
negotiate individually with sellers. Here, for example, sellers may
formally bid against one another for the business of a buyer, or each
buyer may elicit individual price quotes from multiple sellers. A seller
may find it relatively inexpensive to meet the demands of particular
buyers or types of buyers, and relatively expensive to meet others’

86. Id.
87. Id. at § 3.35 n.50.
88. In this Section, we will refer to mergers as encompassing the less complete integrations
covered by the Joint Venture Guidelines unless otherwise noted.
89. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 3 (“countervailing power, however, is unlikely to
duplicate the competitive outcome and raises its own risks.”).
90. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at § 2.
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demands.91

In other words, the Merger Guidelines allow for a relevant market
definition that would be limited to particular types of buyers if market
realities so demanded. This logic would also apply to a merger of
buyers who sell to the same particular type of seller. Such a merger may
raise anticompetitive issues.92
There is also some debate as to whether countervailing power
should serve as an acceptable defense to a merger that would otherwise
raise anticompetitive concerns. The efficiencies analysis in the Merger
Guidelines suggests that such a defense would not be appropriate. For
example, the Merger Guidelines require that proposed efficiencies be
“cognizable,” meaning that they must be specific to the merger and not
arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.93 The Merger
Guidelines specifically mention that those efficiencies related to
“procurement, management, or capital cost are less likely to be mergerspecific or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.”94
Increased bargaining power vis-à-vis an upstream supplier with market
power which improves procurement practices appears uncognizable
under this definition. Likewise, a buyer merger resulting in the ability to
reduce input prices as a result of monopsony power may not be
cognizable, because these efficiencies would stem from an
anticompetitive reduction in output or service.
b. Downstream Mergers
Proponents of more stringent treatment of buyer mergers have
raised a number of reasons why these mergers might be more likely to
raise competitive concerns than their supply-side relatives.95 For
instance, Carstensen argues that buyers’ incentives to cheating on
collusive agreements might be weak relative to the incentive to defect in
91. Id. at § 2.21 n.21.
92. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1066. This was the case in FTC v. Staples, Inc. where the district
court issued a preliminary injunction against the merger of two office supply superstores on the
grounds that the set of services offered by these superstores was sufficiently unique to define a
relevant market.
93. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at § 4.
94. Id.
95. We hold aside practical matters such as identifying the buyer and the seller in vertical
distribution chains. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 13, at 4. Marius Schwartz compares the cases of
a manufacturer selling goods to a retailer versus a manufacturer who retains ownership of the goods
but purchases distribution services from the retailer for a percentage of the final price. Id. A merger
of the retailers results in an increase in buyer power in the first case and seller power in the second.
Id.
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supplier markets, that monopsony power is prevalent in agricultural
markets such as the poultry industry, and that a retailer only need control
a small percentage of the total number of outlets to obtain better terms
from suppliers.96 Carstensen concludes that these concerns justify the use
of separate metrics for competitive effects analysis of buyer mergers.97
Certainly, antitrust authorities should not turn a blind eye to retail
markets. In particular, agencies should be concerned with increased
concentration at the retail level, other changes that dampen the costs of
colluding, and the ability to engage in unilateral overbuying. However,
our view is that the Merger Guidelines are broad enough to incorporate
these concerns. For instance, the Merger Guidelines expressly allow
considerable room for the agencies to consider factors facilitating
collusive agreements.98 There is little serious economic evidence that
lower market shares are necessary for buyers to obtain market power. In
sum, the Merger Guidelines are sufficiently flexible to be applied to
mergers involving buyer power without modification. Nonetheless,
buyer-side mergers deserve symmetric treatment such that agencies
remain acutely aware of buyer market conditions that may give rise to
competitive concerns.
B. European Union
This section details the approach taken by the Community Courts
and the Commission when dealing with the exercise of “buyer power.”
The issue has arisen predominantly in merger cases, either as
‘countervailing’ power when assessing upstream mergers among
suppliers, or else as anticipatory concern when considering downstream
mergers among buyers. There is nothing in principle precluding its use
as a concept under Treaty Articles 81 and 82 (analogous to Sherman Act
Sections 1 and 2), and, indeed, buyer cooperatives and upstream
collusive activity are examined under Article 81.99 However, because
both the law and policy on collusion is clear, we ignore such cases in
what follows.
96. See Carstensen, Buyer Power and Merger Analysis – The Need for Different Metrics,
supra note 14.
97. Id.
98. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at § 2.12. For instance, the Merger Guidelines state
that the following factors may be relevant to an investigation: “the availability of key information
concerning market conditions, transactions and individual competitors; the extent of firm and
product heterogeneity; pricing or marketing practices typically employed by firms in the market; the
characteristics of buyers and sellers; and the characteristics of typical transactions.” Id. at § 2.1.
99. Commission Decision 89/408/EEC, National Sulphuric Acid Association, 1989 O.J. (L
190) (a purchasing cooperative granted exemption); see generally Whish, supra note 32, at 569.
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1. Dominance
“Dominance” is the name given in European competition law to
that level of market power which is regarded as sufficiently serious as to
warrant oversight of the behavior of the “dominant” firm. It is the
second stage in the tripartite analysis conducted under Treaty Article 82
dealing with “abuse of dominance.”100 The first stage is the
determination of market definition and the last stage the determination of
whether the dominant firm has “abused” its dominance. The first two
stages are also required to be undertaken by the Commission in all
merger decisions (the third stage regarding abuse being anticipatory
rather than inquisitive, since merger analysis is an ex ante, forwardlooking activity).
The Court of Justice’s definition of “dominance” expressly takes
into account the influence that customers might have with respect to
suppliers: a dominant firm must be able “to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of
consumers.”101 If a supplier’s competitive behavior is significantly
constrained by its customers, it cannot be dominant. A buyer can itself
be, or become, dominant (say, through a supermarket merger leading to
a high share of retail grocery sales).102 In that case the word “customers”
would need to (and does) encompass input suppliers.
2. Mergers
Most of the jurisprudence dealing with “buyer power” has occurred
in the context of a buyer’s ability to constrain suppliers’ exercise of
market power, thus limiting the potential dominance of suppliers.103
a. Supply-Side Mergers
If buyers are able to influence the terms and conditions on which
they acquire goods, then suppliers in that same market, by the definition
of dominance given above, are not able to act independently of their
customers.
Especially in the context of mergers, but also under Treaty Article
100. Treaty, supra note [11].
101. Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, at ¶ 65; Case 322/81, NV
Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. II-3461, at ¶ 30.
102. See, e.g., Commission Decision 97/277/EEC, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 (L 110) 53; and
Carrefour/Promodes, Case No COMP/M.1684 Comm. Dec. of 25 Jan. 2000.
103. See, e.g., Philip Morris/Nabisco, Case No COMP/M.2072, Comm. Dec of 10 Oct. 2000;
Friesland Coberco/Nutricia, Case No COMP/M.2399, Comm. Dec. of 8 Aug. 2001.
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82, the Commission has increasingly recognized the role of buyer power
as a countervailing force, limiting the market power of suppliers and
shifting the balance of negotiating leverage in many markets from
suppliers and towards customers. Buyer power has been held to result in
a “neutralization”104 of the effects of supplier dominance or
concentration: i.e., “removing the possibility of suppliers exercising
market power.”105 Strong buyer power constrains suppliers’ ability to
raise prices, and in many cases obliges suppliers to lower prices.106
In Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May Holding, the top five customers
for nut snacks held shares of 70-95% in various national markets,
leading the Commission to conclude that the joint venture on the supply
side would not create or strengthen a dominant position.107 In Friesland
Coverco/Nutricia (where the four largest customers of dairy drinks
accounted for 70-90% of the market), buyer power was one of the main
factors leading to the approval of a merger.108 In Philip Morris/Nabisco,
an acquisition in the market for chocolate confectionery was found not
to create or strengthen a dominant position, in part because large
retailers accounted for nearly 50-60% of total chocolate confectionery
purchases.109 In Enso/Stora, the Commission found that, as
countervailing buyer power existed in the market for newsprint where
the two largest buyers each accounted for 25-35% of the market, a
merger of two suppliers (despite these suppliers having up to 70% share
of the relevant market) would not create or strengthen a dominant
position.110
b. Buyer-Side Mergers
With respect to mergers between buyers and thus anticipatory
concern about future “buyer power,” the commission has decided fewer
cases. Two important decisions by DG Comp. have set out the basic
principles upon which mergers in the retail sector are now assessed.

104. UPM-Kymmene/Haindl, Case No COMP/M.2498, Comm. Dec. of 21 Nov. 2001.
105. Commission Decision 1999/641, Enso Stora, 1999 O.J. (L 254) 9, 20.
106. Bloom, supra note 10, at 409.
107. The top five customers had market shares of 70% in France, 71% in Germany, 95% in
Sweden and 95% in the Netherlands Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/May Holding, Case No
COMP/JV.32, Comm. Dec. of 28 Feb. 2000, at ¶ 57.
108. Friesland Coberco/Nutricia, Case No COMP/M.2399, at ¶ 25.
109. Philip Morris/Nabisco, Case No COMP/M.2072, at ¶ 25.
110. Commission Decision 1999/641, Enso Stora, 1999 O.J. (L 254) 9 at ¶ 63. See also
Commission Decision 97/277/EEC, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 (L 110) 53 at ¶ 133 (largest customer
accounted for 55% of the relevant market).
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These are the Kesko/Tuko111 and the Rewe/Meinl112 decisions, which
relate to the merger of two leading food retail chains in Finland and
Austria respectively. In the former case the merger was prohibited and in
the latter it was allowed subject to undertakings.113 These decisions have
informed subsequent antitrust proceedings, such as the recent
Carrefour/Promodes merger case114 in France in which the merger,
despite there being no concern about ex post dominance (unilateral or
collective), required the firms to give undertakings. The Commission’s
concern about “dependence” led it to propose a “threat point” theory of
buyer-mergers in the retail sector.115 This threat point is defined as the
maximum share of revenues that a supplier can afford to lose without a
very serious risk of being driven to bankruptcy. Survey evidence of
upstream suppliers indicated an average threshold of 22%.116 The
Commission stated that a supplier is in a position of “economic
dependence” on a buyer when this threshold is exceeded, as loss of this
amount of business could lead to bankruptcy.
c. Mechanics of Merger Assessment
The assessment of market power in merger analysis generally
involves three stages.117
The first stage involves the defining of the relevant market, which
in the case of buyer power is the market for the procurement of the
relevant product. The procurement market comprises those demand
sources to which suppliers may realistically sell their product.118
The second stage measures concentration in the properly defined
procurement market: a finding of high demand-side concentration
suggests buyer-side market power, which either does or (post-merger)
will rise to the level of “dominance” (if a buyer-side merger is under
consideration), or else can potentially act as a “countervailing power”
constraining suppliers (if a supplier-side merger is under consideration).
111. Commission Decision 97/277/EEC, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 (L 110) 53.
112. Commission Decision 1999/674, Rewe/Meinl, 1999 O.J. (L 274) 1, 12 (EC).
113. See Commission Decision 97/277/EEC, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 (L 110) 53; Commission
Decision 1999/674, Rewe/Meinl, 1999 O.J. (L 274) 1, 12 (EC).
114. Carrefour/Promodes, Case No COMP/M.1684 Comm. Dec. of 25 Jan. 2000.
115. For more on “dependence” theory, see Vogel, supra note 9.
116. The Commission’s constant practice of surveying complainants seems to be in ignorance
of the “cheap talk” nature of such activity. On the bad news of using subjective survey data, see
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say?: Implications for
Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 67 (2001).
117. DOBSON REPORT, supra note 58, at p. 32.
118. Lücking, supra note 8.
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Customer concentration is significant both in absolute terms (the
percentage of demand accounted for by the largest buyer or buyers) and
relative to concentration on the supply side.
In assessing demand-side concentration in procurement markets,
the Commission has typically looked at the percentage of purchases of
the relevant products accounted for by the largest customers in the
market. It has tended to examine the issue of buyer power carefully in
markets where the largest customers individually account for at least
25% of the relevant market or where they account for at least 50-60% of
the market as a group.
The third stage involves an examination of the market behavior by
both suppliers and customers in the relevant market. The Commission
has, in a number of cases, made a comparison between the two sides of
the market to determine whether demand-side concentration exceeds
supply-side concentration. The Commission has found that buyer power
made the possibility of supplier dominance unlikely in cases where
demand-side concentration was equal to or greater than supply-side
concentration.119
C. European National Regimes
Some European nations (such as France and Germany) in the 1990s
enacted regimes specifically focused on “buyer power.”120 These
regimes, utilizing a theory of “dependence,” attempt to fill the alleged
lacuna in the supra-national European law, but antitrust authorities
appear to have been reluctant to enforce statutes based on a concept as
vague as “dependence.”
In any event, it will always be difficult for the competition authorities
to apply any provisions of law that do not fully square with classical
price theory and its market effect requirement. There is currently no
widely accepted theoretical foundation for a theory of economic
dependence. Therefore, in the absence of an established rational
doctrine, the scope for application of the rules on abuse of dependence
is problematical. Who is to say where economic dependence begins
and ends? The scope is virtually unlimited. Given their deep-seated
doubts as to the legitimacy of any measures in this area, it is
understandable that the competition authorities have steered clear of
119. Philip Morris/Nabisco, supra note 103, at ¶ 25 (demand-side concentration ratio 50-60%;
supply-side 40-50); Commission Decision 1999/641, Enso Stora, 1999 O.J. (L 254) 9, 20, ¶ 84
(demand-side and supply-side concentration equal on the liquid packaging board market, with the
top three accounting for nearly 100% of the market).
120. For a description of these laws, see Vogel, supra note 9, at 4-5.
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this area.121

It is unfortunate that in its most recent merger decisional practice
the Commission appears to be incorporating this vague and
jurisprudentially limited concept into its conditions for approval.122
IV. SUPERMARKET COMPETITION
Recently, much focus has been placed on the alleged growth of
market power of supermarkets and other big-box retailers. In the U.K.,
the Competition Commission conducted an inquiry into the U.K.
supermarket industry.123 In continental Europe the Commission allowed
a merger between two supermarket chains in France (the
Carrefour/Promodes merger), but only after undertakings dealing with
concerns of increased post-merger bargaining power were made by the
merging firms.124 Further, antitrust authorities have long scrutinized the
supermarket industry in the United States, and are increasingly doing so
in the European Union and its member states. This focus has been
applied to the competitive process by which suppliers bid for access to
retail shelf space, the contractual relationships between manufacturers
and supermarkets, and supermarket mergers.125
As a representative example of the “concern” regarding the
supermarket sector, in the Commission’s Green Paper (on Vertical
Restraints) states:
Manufacturers are more and more dependent on distributors and
grocery retail for getting their products to the consumers. Since the
shelf space for new products is limited, conflicts arise between the
increasing number of new product launches and the retailers’ objective
[of] profit optimization. This conflict has resulted in retailers asking
for listing fees (key money) or for discount schemes which sometimes
go beyond possible cost savings of the manufacturers. Given the
pressure on shelf space, products which are not in a number one or two
position increasingly run the risk of being delisted and replaced by

121. Vogel, supra note 9, at 9.
122. See, e.g., Carrefour/Promodes, Case No COMP/M.1684 Comm. Dec. of 25 Jan. 2000.
123. The Competition Commission Report, supra note 7, discussed in Dobson, Exploiting
Buyer Power: Lessons from the British Grocery Store Trade, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. (2005) 529. It
should be noted that the Commission eventually reported a finding of no significant market power.
124. Carrefour/Promodes, Case No COMP/M.1684 Comm. Dec. of 25 Jan. 2000.
125. See, e.g., Commission Decision 97/277/EEC, Kesko/Tuko, 1997 (L 110) 53 at ¶ 133,
where the Commission observed that an agreement with the merged entity would be the only way
for a supplier to guarantee shelf space in retail outlets representing over 55% of the Finnish market,
creating unique purchasing power.
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large retailers’ own brands.126

In this section, we examine how buyer power affects the
competitive analysis of various practices in the supermarket industry.
A. The Economics of Supermarkets
Supermarkets offer a number of advantages to suppliers and
consumers. First, their economies of scale and scope enable them to
obtain inputs more cheaply and thus sell final goods more cheaply to
end-customers. A second advantage is that supermarkets and large
retailers generally are able to reduce consumer search costs. The third
advantage is that supermarkets resolve the coordination problem for
shoppers and distributors (a classic complementarity) by placing
substitutable goods next to each other. That is, supermarkets are sites of
simultaneous substitutability and complementarity. For example,
breakfast cereals on a shelf compete with each other while
simultaneously offering complementarities with other products in the
store. These are important benefits offered to consumers.
It should be noted that economic analysis of multi-product retailers,
like supermarkets, has often failed to recognize some fundamental
economic realities of the relationships between suppliers and
supermarkets. This is the result of assuming that supermarkets simply
translate consumer demand for each product at the retail level into a
derived demand faced by the manufacturer at the wholesale level. Such
an analysis assumes explicitly or implicitly that consumers know the
exact product and brand that they will purchase before they come to the
store. This is unlikely to be true in general. Retailers have the ability to
influence consumer demand, and have discretion regarding what
products to stock and how those products will be allocated on their
shelves. As will be seen in the next subsection, this economic reality
significantly impacts the relationships between suppliers and
supermarkets because suppliers compete for access to shelf space.
B. Specific Issues
Some supermarket practices are sometimes suspected of being the
result of buyer power or excessive bargaining power. Indeed, if “buyer
power” is defined at its broadest as the ability of a customer to influence
the terms on which it purchases goods, then because the terms of supply

126. Commission’s Green Paper, supra note 8, at 66.
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contracts vary widely, retailer practices that could be cited as evidence
of buyer power are potentially endless. For example, the U.K.
Competition Commission identified no less than 52 different practices
which could evidence buyer power.127 However, some of these practices
have received more attention than others. For instance, the FTC recently
conducted an inquiry into the ubiquitous supermarket practice of using
slotting fees, or, more generally, supplier payments for shelf space of all
kinds.128 Other behavioural practices common in the supermarket
industry which have come under suspicion in some quarters include
category management, and the introduction of private label brands. We
briefly discuss each in turn.
1. Slotting Allowances
Supermarkets supply premium shelf space which creates
promotional sales.129 Premium shelf space, an end-cap, or an increase in
facings will result in additional sales. In large part, this is because
consumers do not always know what products or what particular brands
they will purchase before they enter the supermarket. Klein and Wright
show that shelf space is essentially a form of promotion, and that
supermarkets generally have an insufficient incentive to promote a
particular brand from the supplier’s point of view.130 Because retail
shelf space produces incremental sales by increasing the reservation
values of some consumers, promotional shelf space can be thought of as
providing a targeted discount to “marginal” consumers who would not

127. In its analysis, the Competition Commission grouped these 52 practices into eight
categories: those requiring suppliers to make payments or concessions to gain access to supermarket
shelf space; those imposing conditions relating to suppliers’ trade with other retailers; those
applying different standards to different suppliers’ offers; those imposing an unfair imbalance of
risk; those imposing retrospective changes to contractual terms with suppliers; those restricting
suppliers’ access to the market; those imposing charges and transferring costs to suppliers; and
those requiring suppliers of groceries to use third-party suppliers nominated by the retailer. The
Competition Commission Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 2.461, ¶ 2.462.
128. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE RETAIL GROCERY
INDUSTRY: SELECTED CASE STUDIES IN FIVE PRODUCT CATEGORIES (2003) [hereinafter SLOTTING
ALLOWANCES] available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf.
129. See ADAM RENNHOFF, PAYING FOR SHELF SPACE: AN INVESTIGATION OF
MERCHANDISING ALLOWANCES IN THE GROCERY INDUSTRY (2004); Dreze et al., Shelf
Management and Space Elasticity, 70 J. OF RETAILING 301 (1994); Charles S. Areni et al., Point-ofPurchase Displays, Product Organization, and Brand Purchase Likelihoods, 27 J. OF THE
ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE 428 (1999).
130. Klein, Benjamin and Wright, Joshua D., “The Economics of Slotting Arrangements”
(2005) (American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings Working Paper) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=773464.
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otherwise purchase the product.131 Therefore, Klein and Wright show
that slotting allowances are an efficient element of the normal
competitive process.
Antitrust enforcement on the other hand has sometimes viewed
slotting fees as a mechanism by which suppliers with market power can
“overbuy” shelf space in order to exclude rivals.132 However, the
possibility of anticompetitive overbuying of shelf space is remote;
theories of anticompetitive exclusion require significant economies of
scale in manufacturing.133 While accepting that any particular case
would need to be considered on its merits, such economies of scale are
unlikely to be present in many grocery products and therefore
“overbuying” is unlikely to explain the use of slotting generally.
Further, slotting allowances generally only bind supermarkets to provide
premium shelf space for a short period of time. Under these conditions,
it is highly unlikely that a competitor will be disadvantaged and unable
to compete on a level playing field for promotional shelf space.134
2. Category Management
Along with slotting allowances, antitrust authorities have concerned
themselves with the category management relationships between
suppliers and retailers.135 Category management is a business technique
by which retailers divide decisions concerning shelf space allocation,
promotion, and inventory by product category.136 Category management
generally involves a retailer designating a particular manufacturer as
“category captain” or “category manager.” A category manager
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., SLOTTING ALLOWANCES, supra note 128. This focus has also resulted in
litigation. See Complaint, In the Matter of McCormick, 2000 FTC LEXIS 43 (FTC 2000) (No. C3939); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.C.C. 2000), rev’d, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir.
2001); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 363 (M.D.N.C. 2002);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W. 3d 287 (2003); Conwood Co. v. United States
Tobacco Co., 290 F. 3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). Slotting fees and other forms of shelf space payments
were also central to Coca-Cola’s recent settlement with the European Commission that limits the
amount of shelf space that Coca-Cola can purchase from retailers, as well as Coca-Cola’s ability to
offer rebates conditioned on exclusivity or specified levels of sales. See Undertaking, Case
Comp/39.116/B-2-Coca-Cola. See also Interpretation Bulletin, supra note 5; General Director’s
Position supra note 5.
133. See, e.g., Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
134. See Empirical Industrial Organization Roundtable: Hearing Before the Federal Trade
Commission (2001) (comments of Dr. Klein at page 83), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/be/empiricalioroundtabletranscript.pdf; Klein and Wright, supra note 34.
135. Vogel, supra note 9, at 10.
136. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 47. Category management has been employed in several
retail trades for years, but is relatively new to the grocery retail industry. Id.
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collaborates with the retailer and provides advice concerning which
products to carry and how they should be allocated on the shelf space
using a schematic known as a “plan-o-gram.”
While very little work has been done to empirically test the
marketing benefits of category management,137 it recently played a
significant role in a $1 billion verdict in Conwood Co. v. United States
Tobacco.138 Klein, Murphy, and Wright analyze the economics of
category management, showing that category management can reduce
retailer free-riding on supplier payments for promotional shelf space
performance in a less restrictive manner than exclusive dealing.139
Klein, Murphy, and Wright show that because manufacturer payments
for promotional shelf space create the opportunity for dealer free-riding
on the payments by taking the payments but failing to perform, it makes
economic sense that the parties will desire a mechanism to enforce the
agreement.140 Category management, by shifting control of the retailer
shelf space to the manufacturer, reduces the retailer incentive to free-ride
in a manner that is far less restrictive than exclusive dealing.141
While appreciating that category management might have proconsumer effects, antitrust authorities and commentators have expressed
concern that the practice might facilitate exclusion from supermarket
shelf space.142 While not directly related to Salop’s RRC overbuying
theory, the exclusion mechanism is quite similar. The FTC Report states
that: “a captain that is able to control decisions about product placement
and promotions could hinder the entry or expansion of other
manufacturers, leading to less variety and possibly higher prices.”143
This was one theory advocated by Conwood in its successful antitrust
137. One study reports that the introduction of category management in the laundry detergent
segment at a single retailer was correlated with higher average prices, lower sales, but higher retailer
profits as inter-brand competition to become the category manager forced lower wholesale prices.
See Suman Basuroy, et al., Impact of Category Management on Retail Prices and Performance:
Theory and Evidence, 65 J. MARKETING 16 (2001).
138. Conwood Co., 290 F.3d at 795 (concluding that the manufacturer provided sufficient
evidence that the competitor’s removing its racks was exclusionary without a legitimate business
justification).
139. Benjamin Klein and Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust Law and Economics of Category
Management, in mimeo (on file with author) (anticipated publication 2006).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Debra Desrocher, et al., Analysis of Antitrust Challenges to Category Captain
Arrangements, 22 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 201 (2003); Robert Steiner, Category
Management—A Pervasive New Horizontal/ Vertical Format, 15 ANTITRUST 77 (2001); Thomas
Leary, A Second Look at Category Management 2-3 (May 17, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/040519categorymgmt.pdf.
143. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
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suit against United States Tobacco, which also included allegations of
product destruction and other business torts.144
As with the claim that there exists a possibility that slotting
allowances might result in the anticompetitive exclusion of rivals, we are
skeptical that category management offers any serious competitive threat
short of a naked collusive agreement wherein the manufacturer would
serve as the hub of a conspiracy amongst supermarkets. Price-fixing
laws are more than sufficient to handle that type of behavior, and there is
no debate that it does and should violate antitrust laws. However, the
unilateral anticompetitive potential for the abuse of a category
management position is mitigated by the fact that the agreements with
retailers are terminable at will, that they require significant economies of
scale in the supply of the product, and because such abuses would run
against the interest of the retailer.145 It is likely that category
management will come to be seen in that class of agreements initially
treated suspiciously by antitrust authorities, only to be shown later, and
upon closer inspection, to be part of the normal competitive process. It
is important to note that both slowing allowances and category
management are part of the competitive process for product distribution
that brings substantial benefits to consumers. Klein and Wright show
that, during the time period where slotting allowances and category
management were gaining in popularity amongst supermarket chains,
retailer profits did not increase; payments were being passed on to
consumers as a result of retail competition.146
3. Private-Label Products
Retailers that offer own-label products are both customers and
competitors of branded product suppliers. The most important benefit to
retailers of successful private-label programs is that it strengthens their
position vis-a-vis their suppliers. By increasing the retailer’s negotiating
leverage against suppliers: they reduce the retailers’ dependence on any
individual branded product;147 give the retailer greater flexibility to
144. See Conwood Co., 290 F.3d at 779.
145. Klein and Wright, supra note 34, at 23.
146. Id. See also Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2006).
147. The U.K. Competition Commission reported that in the United Kingdom, the largest
supplier to the largest grocery retailer accounts for less than 3% of the retailer’s total purchases, and
only eight suppliers account for 1% or more of its purchases. The Competition Commission Report,
supra note 7, at ¶ 2.457. It concluded that any grocery retailer with a greater than 8% share in the
grocery procurement market (namely, all the five main U.K. retail chains) had buyer power. Id. at ¶
2.458 .
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reduce branded products’ shelf space or to stock a more limited range;
and increases the credibility of the retailer’s threats to delist branded
products. In other words, private-label products are a form of
investment in bargaining position, common enough in bilateral
bargaining scenarios.148 A further possible benefit to retailers of ownlabel products is that they enables them customarily to be in possession
of sensitive commercial information from their branded product
suppliers about, for example, the marketing and promotional plans of the
branded product. The information is valuable both for the advantage it
gives in bargaining with the manufacturer who owns the brand, and also
for the positive spillover it creates for the retailer in the marketing of its
own, related, private brands.149
It is worth pointing out again that, in common law commercial
jurisprudence at least, courts are exceedingly reluctant to interpose
themselves into the dynamics of bargaining involving experienced large
firms. In our view, none of these specific practices warrant special
concern over supermarket buyer power.
V. CONCLUSION
In both Europe and the United States there has been much antitrust
authority activity recently regarding retail “buyer power.” Courts and
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have become alive to the
possibility of the potential special problem of buyer power. In Europe in
particular, with its comparatively greater concern for the protection of
competitors rather than of the competitive process, such concerns have
invariably led to a more hands-on approach to the implementation of
competition law. In this paper we provide structure to the often
bewildering and conceptually difficult number of categories and
practices deemed worthy of greater scrutiny because of possible anticompetitiveness. We build on the modern economics of bargaining
markets and vertical restraints to provide a clear framework for the
general analysis of retail upstream market power. It is our view that

148. Schelling, supra note 47.
149. Collins states that
[t]he retailer will usually obtain from all the major suppliers who supply him advanced
details of their marketing and promotional plans, new product introductions and pricing
intention . . . that information may well be used by the retailer, qua brand owner, in
taking pricing, marketing and promotional decisions about his own private label products
that compete with suppliers’ brands.
Philip G.H. Collins, Retailer Buyer Power: Abusive Behaviour and Mergers/Acquisitions, 2001
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 423, 431 (B. Hawk ed., 2000).
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arguments for special laws or special antitrust enforcement relating to
retail market power are unwarranted on the basis of basic economic
theory, and are likely to prove jurisprudentially problematic as has been
the case in some European states.
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